Indonesia Ramps Up Pressure for South China Sea Code of Conduct in 2026

Indonesia is pushing hard to break a decades-long diplomatic deadlock. Foreign Minister Sugiono said on Thursday that Jakarta wants the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea completed and signed this year, warning against any further delays in negotiations.

“We hope the CoC can be signed this year. We will find a way to prevent further delays,” Sugiono told reporters in Jakarta.

Why This Matters

The South China Sea is one of the world’s most contested waterways. Around one-third of global maritime trade passes through these waters, including the strategically vital Malacca Strait that connects East Asia with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Any instability there ripples through global supply chains, energy markets, and economic growth.

Multiple countries — including China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei — hold overlapping maritime claims. China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” assertion overlaps with exclusive economic zones recognized under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), creating persistent legal uncertainty and recurring friction at sea.

A 24-Year Wait

ASEAN and China first agreed to work toward a code of conduct back in 2002 with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) signed in Phnom Penh. That declaration was non-binding. More than two decades later, the legally binding CoC that was meant to follow remains unfinished.

The prolonged process reflects the inherent tension in ASEAN’s consensus-based diplomacy. While consensus protects unity, it also slows decision-making when national interests diverge — and China is a central economic partner for many ASEAN member states, shaping their negotiating positions.

Momentum Building

Recent months have brought signs of progress:

January 2026: At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Cebu, Philippines, Southeast Asian foreign ministers agreed to finalize the CoC this year.
February 2026: Senior officials from ASEAN and China met for the 25th ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the DoC implementation, reviewing progress and discussing ways to advance negotiations.
March 2026: Chinese Ambassador to ASEAN Wang Qing stated China has “strong political will” to complete the CoC this year, a commitment reaffirmed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

What the CoC Would Do

Unlike the 2002 DoC, the Code of Conduct is intended to be a legally binding framework that would:

Set agreed rules of behavior for all parties in contested waters
Reduce the risk of miscalculation between naval and coast guard forces
Prevent escalation through self-restraint mechanisms
Establish practical maritime cooperation in areas like search and rescue and environmental protection

Indonesia’s Pivotal Role

As the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a non-claimant state in the South China Sea disputes, Indonesia occupies a unique position. Jakarta has long advocated for ASEAN centrality in managing regional security challenges and has consistently pushed for UNCLOS-based resolution of maritime disputes.

Analysts argue that Indonesia’s diplomatic weight and perceived neutrality make it the natural broker for a deal — but also that Jakarta needs to recalibrate its approach to ASEAN at a moment when regional cohesion matters most.

The Gap Between Words and Action

China has repeatedly emphasized its support for dialogue and regional stability. Yet incidents at sea continue — fishing vessels face enforcement pressure, coast guards operate aggressively, and naval forces maneuver in close proximity. Each incident raises the risk of escalation.

This gap between diplomatic assurances and behavior on the water is precisely why a binding CoC matters. Without clear, enforceable rules, crisis management remains dependent on political goodwill rather than established procedures.

What’s at Stake

The stakes extend far beyond the South China Sea. A successful CoC would signal that ASEAN’s consensus model can still deliver meaningful outcomes on hard security issues. Failure would reinforce skepticism about the bloc’s relevance and potentially accelerate a shift toward bilateral arrangements dominated by larger powers.

For Indonesia specifically, delivering the CoC would cement its role as a regional power broker and validate its long-standing investment in ASEAN as a strategic platform.

The clock is ticking. Whether 2026 finally becomes the year the CoC gets signed — or joins the long list of missed deadlines — will depend on how effectively Indonesia and its ASEAN partners can navigate the competing interests at play.